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The main objective of the paper is to establish the link between the exogenous migration 
shocks and endogenous foreign direct investment flows in a small open economy setting with 
international capital mobility, immobile labour and a non-traded good. I find that the 
immigration of the high-skilled individuals and FDI flows are always complements in the 
quantity sense. The immigration of the low-skilled individuals will cause an outflow (inflow) 
of capital, if domestic non-traded and imported goods are relatively weak (strong) substitutes 
in consumption. Besides, I explain the attitudes of native individuals towards high-skilled and 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
 
Globalization has become a major feature of the modern economic world. The removal of 
restrictions to international flows of goods and production factors, integration of markets and 
creation of economic blocks are believed to bring substantial gains to the countries opening 
their borders, as well as to enhance global welfare. The movement of goods, labour, capital, 
technology and services in search of better opportunities is constantly growing all over the 
world, leading to more efficient resource allocation and new patterns of income distribution.  
 
Undoubtedly, increasing liberalization brings about higher interdependence of all channels of 
integration, creating non-negligible positive and negative externalities. For instance, trade 
liberalisation is assumed to be a growth-driving factor for the less developed countries.   
However, the secondary effects may include costly resource reallocation, disappearing of 
entire industries, and even rising emigration pressures
1. Migration is not only associated with 
gains and losses for the host county (in terms of higher growth prospects, resolution of the 
problems related to social payments and ageing population,  transfer of ideas, or illegal 
immigration), but also has both positive and negative repercussions on sending countries 
(remittances, brain-drain). Faini (2004) notes that “…Globalisation is not only about the rise 
in trade, FDI and migration. It is also about the changing linkages among these flows”. 
Therefore, besides separate examination of determinants of trade and factor flows, it is also 
necessary to explore how different integrated markets interact.  
 
Despite the increased volumes of goods and factors which cross national borders, one must 
recognise that asymmetries exist in the speed, incentives and policies applied to these 
movements. In a few last decades, the barriers to international labour movements have 
become higher than those applied to capital flows and good flows
2 
3. In this regard, recent 
                                                 
1 If labour migration entails a monetary cost, some financially constrained would-be migrants are unable to move 
to the desired destination (especially, in relatively poor countries). Trade liberalisation raises income and relaxes 
the financial constraint, thereby increasing outward migration.  See Lopez and Schiff (1998).  
2 This asymmetry is a characteristic of the present phase of globalization, since it was not manifested in the XIX 
and early XX centuries (a period characterized by large mobility of both capital and labor) nor in the first twenty 
five years following the Second World War (a period in which both factors exhibited very little mobility), see 
United Nations (2004). Faini (2004) calls migration the “grand absentee of the present globalisation period”.   
3 The may be several explanations why international labour movements are less liberalised. One obvious  reason 
is that, beyond purely economic considerations, migration flows are associated with additional economic and 
human costs  (nationalism, xenophobia, cultural differences, abuse of social security systems, threats of illegal 
immigration, intergenerational issues).  These non-economic and indirect economic effects contribute to less 
favourable attitudes to immigration among native voters and as a consequence lead to stricter immigration   3
enlargement of the European Union provides an interesting example. Economic integration 
processes between old and new member states, which were initiated in mid-90s, witnessed 
rapid trade liberalization. Obstacles for FDI flows have also been removed by mutual 
agreement of both sides, making another step towards integrated single market. On the 
contrary, the progress toward free movement of labour has been extremely slow, and was 
determined in potential host countries more by political and social, than economic 
considerations. Currently, only three of the old member states are open for migrants from the 
new states
4, the others introduced 2 to 7 years transition periods. Migration issues continue to 
be central in the on-going negotiations on Turkey’s accession to the EU.   
 
Relatively high restrictions to legal immigration suggest that actual international labour flows 
are determined by changes in national regulation (such as imposition of immigration quotas), 
and not solely by wage differential in sending and receiving countries. It is also reasonable to 
assume that the supply of immigrants is inelastic, implying that the wage differential is always 
high enough to fill the imposed immigration quotas. On the contrary, less regulated     
international capital flows are more likely to respond to differences in capital price, thereby 
leading to capital reward equalisation across borders. Overall, we can consider immigration 
flows as exogenous and capital flows endogenous.  
 
The objective of this paper is twofold.  First, it will attempt to establish the link between the 
international flows of productive capital and labour taking into account the above-mentioned 
asymmetry, and thereby will contribute to the literature on the links between migration, trade 
and FDI flows. Precisely, I will study the response of endogenous capital flows to exogenous 
migration shocks. The second objective of the paper is to determine attitudes towards 
immigration when capital is becoming increasingly mobile, both between sectors and across 
national borders. The resulting attitudes will then be compared to the case where capital is not 
allowed to move across borders, based on the conclusions of my previous work ‘Attitudes 
towards immigration in a small open economy”.  
 
The set-up for studying the relationship between factor flows is a natural extension of the 
model I developed in Ivlevs (2005), which I accommodate now for internationally mobile 
                                                                                                                                                         
policies. See, for example,  Hillman and Weiss (1999) and Schiff (2002) for the role of non-economic factors in 
international labour migration.  
4 The United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden.    4
capital. I find that inflow of high-skilled immigrants always leads to inward capital flows, 
suggesting complementary relationship between the two. On the other hand, low-skilled 
immigration and FDI are substitutes (complements) in the quantity sense, if the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic non-traded and imported good is lower (higher) than the 
elasticity of factor substitution in domestic non-traded sector.   
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
literature on the links between factor flows. The model is developed in section 3. I turn to the 
analysis of the endogenous capital response to migration shocks in section 4. Section 5 
focuses on natives’ welfare change due to immigration and consecutive FDI flows, and 
explains attitudes towards immigrants. Conclusions follow in section 6. 
 
 
2. RELATED CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
A substantial amount of economic literature describes the substitutability relationship of trade 
vis-à-vis factor flows (see, e.g. Faini, de Melo and Zimmermann 1999 for a survey), and only 
few contributions address the links that exist between different factor flows.  This section 
aims at providing a brief overview of main findings explaining the linkages between capital 
and migration flows.  
 
Wong (1986), (2004) surveys different concepts of substitutability between factor flows. He  
identifies four senses in which factor flows can be substitutes or complements
5: quantitative-
relationship (or quantity), price equalization, world-efficiency and national-welfare sense
6. 
These concepts are closely related but they need not be identical.  In my paper, I will study 
whether an exogenous inflow of labour will result in positive or negative capital flows for the 
                                                 
5 Wong (1986) focuses on the substitutability concepts between trade and factor flows (Appendix A, p.41), 
Wong (2004) applies the same concepts when analysing the relationship between factor flows (labour and 
capital).  
6 In the quantitative-relationship (or quantity) sense, labour and capital flows are substitutes (complements), if 
the a small exogenous increase in the volume of flow of one of them leads to a decrease (an increase) in the 
volume of flow of the other. The factors are said to be substitutes (complements) in the price equalization sense, 
if each of them is sufficient (both are necessary) to give efficient allocation of resources in the world and to 
ensure the equalization of factor prices in host and source countries. In the world-efficiency sense, substitutes 
(complements) refer to the case where either (both) labour or capital mobility is sufficient to establish efficiency 
in world production, and hence maximise potential world welfare.  Finally, in the national welfare sense, factors 
are substitutes  (complements) if either of them are is sufficient to bring maximum welfare to the domestic 
economy, and complements if both of them are required.  
   5
immigration receiving country, thereby combining Wong’s quantity and national-welfare 
notions of substitution. I will say that FDI and migration are complements (substitutes) if a 
particular country experiences inflows of both factors (an inflow of one factor causes an 
outflow of the other).  
 
The simplest case to assess substitutability between labour and capital movements is to 
consider a two country world where only one good is produced with labour and capital
7 
(Wong, 2004).  If relative factor endowments are different between two countries, so are 
factor price ratios. Factor market liberalisation leads to the movement of a factor from a 
country where it is relatively abundant to a country where it is relatively scarce. As a result, 
factor prices are equalised across countries. Capital and labour flows in this case are 
substitutes both in price and quantity sense.  
 
A famous result of Mundell (1957) states that in 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model trade and 
factor flows are substitutes in the price and quantity sense. Under free trade and production 
diversification, factor prices are equalized across countries, leading zero incentives to factor 
movements. Thus, neither capital, nor labour movements are necessary to increase the 
efficiency of resource allocation. However, if under free trade a country experiences an 
exogenous inflow of one production factor, then factor prices stay constant and there is no 
additional motivation for the other factor to move. Therefore, labour and capital in such a 
framework are neither complements, nor substitutes
8.  
 
Baldwin and Venables (1994) study the interaction between different types of factor mobility 
in the European Eastern enlargement context. They assume that human capital and physical 
capital are complements, therefore the rate at which foreign capital flows into new member 
states affects high-skilled labourers’ wage. Since current and expected wage differentials 
influence the decision of the high-skilled to emigrate, the inflow of capital will affect the 
long-run level of human capital. The changes in the stock of high-skilled workers in turn 
affect the return on foreign investment, meaning that there is circular relationship between 
high-skilled labour and capital flows, and that long-run factor endowments in the new 
                                                 
7 The limitation of such a framework is the absence of trade in goods. 
8 More interesting conclusions follow if one switches from the long-run to medium- and short-run perspective. 
In this case, some factors are immobile across industries, and factor price equalization theorem does not hold. 
Then an exogenous inflow of one factor induces the movement of the other.   
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member states are not predetermined. Baldwin and Venables introduce an externality linking 
the cost of absorbing foreign capital to the stock of skilled labour in the country, and establish 
that two expectations transition paths are possible: “vicious”, associated with high levels of 
skilled labour emigration and low levels of foreign capital inflow, and “virtuous” involving 
little emigration, substantial inflows of foreign capital and technology, and rising wages in the 
Eastern European states.  
 
Davis and Weinstein (2002) use the example of the United States and argue that high-skilled 
labour, low-skilled labour and capital simultaneously seek to enter the US economy because 
of the technological superiority with respect to the rest of the world.  Factor flows in such a 
case are complementary in the quantity sense.  
 
One of the differences of the present paper vis-à-vis the mentioned contributions is the 
assumption of asymmetry in labour and capital flows. I assume that capital can move freely 
across borders implying capital price equalization in the world, whereas movements of labour 
are subject to national immigration policy. The production side of the economy takes Ricardo-
Viner characteristics: capital (mobile factor) can circulate freely across sectors in the domestic 
economy, and labour is sector specific. I introduce a sector producing a non-traded good and 
assume that it employs mobile capital and low-skilled labour. A second sector produces 
exported good and by assumption is specific in high-skilled labour. Thus, my first objective is 
to find how the exogenous inflows of sector specific factors (either low-skilled or high-skilled 
labour) would change the flows of mobile factor (capital). In the second part of the paper, I 
discuss whether native individuals would favour such inflows of foreign labour, based on the 
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2.  THE MODEL  
 
 
In this section I lay out the model and establish the link between the exogenous migration and 
endogenous capital flows, using a general equilibrium framework
9. Sub-section 3.1. develops 
supply side of the model, and provides an answer in which direction the FDI would go after 
the inflow of either low-skilled, or high-skilled foreign workers, if the prices of both goods 
are fixed at the international market. Then in sub-section 3.2. I introduce a domestic non-
traded good, which is an imperfect substitute for the imported good. In the last sub-section I 
show the initial equilibrium.  
 
3.1. SUPPLY SIDE  
 
In this sub-section, I describe briefly the production structure of the economy, and establish 
the formal link between factor prices and factor supplies, following the analysis of 3x2 
specific-factor model in Jones (1971). Before introducing the consumption side with the non-
traded good, I show how capital would respond to migration chocks if both consumption 
goods were tradable.  
 
Let’s consider a classic Ricardo-Viner two-sector economy producing two goods with three 
factors of production. I denote the two goods and the corresponding industries by D and E
10. 
Each industry uses one kind of labour,  D V  and  E V , and some amount of capital,  ND V  and  NE V . 
I let the low-skilled (high-skilled) labour be specific to D (E) industry. The production 
function in each sector exhibits constant returns to scale, and the marginal product of capital 
is diminishing.  DD a  ( EE a ) is the amount specific factor  D V  ( E V ) necessary to produce one 
unit of good D (E). The amount of the mobile factor necessary to produce one unit of the 
domestic (export) good is equal to  ND a  ( NE a ). 
 
Under the assumption of full employment of factors the following conditions hold: 
 
D DD V D a =     (1) 
                                                 
9 This extended version of the model can be found in Ivlevs (2005). However, there capital is not mobile 
internationally.  
10 D (E) willl correspond to the domestic non-traded (exported) good in a general equilibrium analysis.   8
E EE V E a =     (2) 
N NE ND V E a D a = +    (3) 
 
Following Jones (1971, 1975), equations linking the changes in goods and factor prices are
11: 
 
D N ND D DD p R R ˆ ˆ ˆ = +θ θ     (4) 
E N NE E EE p R R ˆ ˆ ˆ = +θ θ ,      (5) 
 
where E D N R R R , , stand for the rewards to the mobile and specific factors, respectively;  D p  
and  E p  are goods’ prices;  E D j N E D i ij ,    , , ,    , = = θ , is factor’s i share in total income 
generated in sector  j , and ‘^’ over a variable denotes the relative change in that variable.  
 






to the change in the factor price ratio (a comparable definition is applied to the sector 
E): 
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Using equations (1)-(6) one obtains formal solutions for the effects on factor returns of 
changes in commodity prices and factor endowments (change equations): 
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∆
+ + = λ λ β β        ( 9 )  
 
                                                 
11 See Ivlevs (2005) for the derivation of all equations.    9
where Nj λ  is the fraction of the mobile factor absorbed by the j-th industry,  E D j , = ; 
.
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The assumption of perfect international capital mobility implies that any downward (upward) 
pressure on the price of capital would cause a negative (positive) flow of capital. In the 
economy where capital is mobile both internationally and between industries, exogenous 
increases in both types of labour raise the price of capital due to higher marginal product of 
the latter. Assuming that both goods are tradable ( ) 0 ˆ ˆ = = E D p p , substitution of   N R ˆ  for 0 in 
equation (9) yields positive values for the change in the amount of capital due to foreign 








,   E D j , = ). In this case, capital “follows” labour.  
 
Figure 1. The inflow of low-skilled labour and a consequent rise in FDI, when goods prices 
stay constant.  
 
Graphically, an increase in supply of either type of labour (for example, the inflow of low-
skilled foreigners is shown in figure 1) shifts the marginal product of capital schedule in the 
respective sector upwards (from MP’ to MP’’). The domestic return to capital raises 
instantaneously (point 2), which attracts foreign capital to the country. The total amount of 
R











capital in the economy increases, pushing down the price of capital until its world equilibrium 
level 
* R  is reached (point 3). On the graph, this corresponds to the leftward shift of the left 
vertical axis. The distance EE’ is equivalent to V’N  and represents the inflow of foreign 
capital.  
 
Note that with constant consumption prices the rewards to specific factors, domestic low-
skilled and high-skilled labour, are not affected by immigration (equations (4) and (5)). Thus, 
the natives, independently of their factor ownership, would be indifferent to both types of 
immigrants if capital is mobile internationally and the goods produced in the economy are 
tradable.  
 
The equation that expresses production volumes changes as a function of goods prices and 
factor supplies is given by: 
 
































θ + = Ω .  
 
3.2. DEMAND SIDE.  
 
The demand side of the model is based on the Armington assumption, under which imperfect 
substitution exists between two consumption goods: a domestic non-traded good (D) and an 
imported good (M). The domestic non-traded good is wholly produced and consumed 
domestically at a given time period, implying that the non-traded good market is always in 
equilibrium. The non-traded good is imperfect substitute for the imported good, and the 
degree (elasticity) of substitution given exogenously by parameterσ . If σ  tends to infinity, 
both consumption goods are perfect substitutes and the (change in) price of the non-traded 
good does not differ from the (change in) imported good price. At the other extreme, if the 
elasticity of substitution for imports tends to zero, and the change in imported good price will 
not be entirely translated into non-traded good price. Formally, the aggregate consumption 
function (Q) takes a CES form over two goods:   11
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σ σ σ σ χ σ σ χ σ D M D M Q     (11) 
 
whereχ  is a parameter that weights the import good relative to the home good.  
 
































k  is a constant and  D p  and  M p  are prices paid by domestic consumers for 
domestic and import good.  
 
 
3.3. INITIAL EQUILIBRIUM  
 
To close the model, a relationship between the goods supplied and demanded in the economy 
is necessary. As mentioned above, the non-traded good market is always in equilibrium. 
Concerning traded goods, the assumption is made that all export revenues are used to 
purchase imports, thus keeping trade balance at zero value. With world prices of exports and 
imports given by  e π  and m π , the following equality holds: 
 
E M E M π π =         ( 1 3 )  
 
Choosing the nominal exchange rate as numeraire and assuming the absence of import tariffs 
and export subsidies, the domestic price for imports and the price at which exports are sold 
are equal to the respective world prices.  
   12
Given the assumptions about foreign prices and equilibrium in the non-traded good market, 
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4. IMMIGRATION, FACTOR PRICES AND CAPITAL FLOWS 
 
Contrary to standard Ricardo-Viner model, where both goods are tradable, in this model the 
inflow of foreign labour will have an effect on the price of non-traded good. Moreover, the 
endogenous response of capital flows to immigration also alters the non-traded good price. 
Since the change in D p  and factor supply changes have a direct influence on the price of 
capital, the expression linking the change in capital price, factor supply changes and the 
change in non-traded good price is necessary.  
 
Differentiation of equations (12) and (13) and use of (10) yields a following system (at 
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   (14) 
 
Solution of (14) provides an expression for the change in the non-traded good price as a 
function of changes in production factor supplies: 
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It can be proved that coefficient  D α  is positive,  E α  is negative, and the sign of  N α  depends 
on the distributive shares with which the mobile factor is used in both industries, 
Ni θ , E D i , = , as well as the elasticities of substitution of production in both sectors  i σ , 
E D i , = .  Thus, the inflow of the low-skilled foreign labour diminishes the price of the non-
traded good, high-skilled immigrants raises it, while the impact of capital inflow on the non-
traded good price depends on the production process characteristics, namely, in which sector 
the largest part of the inflowing FDI will be employed. The higher is degree of substitution 
between import and non-traded goods, the less impact on non-traded good price will be made 
by changes in factor supplies. In what follows, the consequences of high-skilled and low-
skilled immigration will be discussed separately.  
 
 
4.1. HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRATION  
 
There are two channels through which the inflow of high-skilled foreign individuals affects 
the return to capital. First, higher amount of export industry specific factor raises marginal 
product of capital, and consequently, its price. Second, the expansion of export industry vis-à-
vis non-traded sector makes non-traded good relatively scarcer and more expensive. This will 
move the marginal product of capital schedule upwards, leading to an additional rise in capital 
price. Inserting equation (15) into (9) yields the formal expression for the change in capital 























β         (16.1) 
 
Assuming that domestic return to capital was equal to its world equilibrium level prior to 
immigration, higher capital price after the inflow of high-skilled immigrants must 
immediately attract foreign capital in order to restore equilibrium. However, the inflowing   14
capital does not only decrease its price, but also alters the price of the non-traded good, 
according to equation (15). The direction of change of non-traded good price can be both 
positive and negative, depending on production parameters  Ni θ  and i σ ,  D E i , = , thereby also 
determining the scope of final FDI flow.   
 
To obtain the formal expression for the endogenous capital response due to high-skilled 
immigration, I use equation (9) to which I substitute equation (15) for non-traded good price. 
The capital price increase to be offset by capital and non-traded price movements is given by 
(16.1), which with negative sign enters the RHS of equation (9): 
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The nominator in the RHS of the last equation is positive, given that  E α  is negative. The 















D  is positive is available in appendix. This 
means that the effect from capital inflow on the reduction of capital price always surpasses the 
possible opposite effect from non-traded price change (if  N α  is negative), and FDI will 
unambiguously grow after the inflow of high-skilled immigrants. Concerning the quantity of 
the inflowing FDI, the degree is substitution between consumption goods, as well as the sign 
of  N α  are crucial. If the non-traded and imported goods are strong (perfect) substitutes 
() ∞ → σ , the effect of non-traded good price vanishes (whatever the sign of  N α ), and FDI 
increases by  NE λ  per cent due to 1 per cent increase in high-skilled immigration. If σ  takes 
some finite value, positive (negative) value of  N α   implies lower (higher) inflowing FDI 
volumes; alternatively, if the main beneficiary of capital inflow due to high-skilled   15
immigration is export sector (negative  N α ) there will be more FDI than if the domestic non-
traded sector were to assimilate the major part of the inflowing foreign capital.  
 
I show the effect of high-skilled immigration of FDI flows on figures 2.1. and 2.2. The 
inflowing high-skilled individuals are immediately assimilated in the export industry, which 
moves the marginal product of capital curve in export sector upwards (from MP(E) to 
MP’(E)). The relative scarcity of the non-traded good results in its higher price and an upward 
movement of MP(D) schedule in domestic non-traded good sector (from MP(D) to MP’(D)).  
Both effects contribute to the rise in the price of capital from 
* R  to  ' R . This corresponds to 






Fig. 2.1. High-skilled immigration induced change in FDI flow (capital inflow decreases the 
price of domestic non-traded good). 
 
R














MP(E)   16
 
Fig. 2.2. High-skilled immigration induced change in FDI flow (capital inflow increases the 
price of domestic non-traded good). 
 
If  N α  is positive, the capital inflow will lead to the fall in non-traded good price (figure 2.1.). 
The marginal product of capital in D sector schedule shifts downwards, and at the same time 
the distance between two vertical axes increases. A new equilibrium is achieved at point 3 
where capital price gets back to its world equilibrium level 
* R . The resulting FDI inflow 
corresponds to the distance N V'.   
 
A negative  N α  implying the rise in non-traded good price  (figure 2.2.), moves both marginal 
product of capital schedules to the right. Thus, a higher amount of foreign capital is necessary 
to decrease the capital price to its world level ( ) N V ' ' , compared to () N V'  in the case of 
negative  N α .  
 
To conclude, high-skilled immigration always results in inward foreign capital flows; 
moreover, the FDI inflow will be more (less) important, if the consecutive production 
possibility frontier shift is biased towards export (non-traded) good.  
 
 
4.2. LOW-SKILLED IMMIGRATION.  
R











MP’ (D)  MP’’ (D) 
MP (E) 
MP’ (E) MP’(E)   17
 
The channels by low-skilled immigrants induce FDI flows are similar to those outlined in the 
high-skilled immigration case. Low-skilled immigrants are specific to the domestic non-
traded sector, and the first effect of their inflow is the upward shift in the schedule of marginal 
product of capital in D sector (from MP(D) to MP(E) on figures 3.1. and 3.2.), raising the 
price of capital. At the same time, higher potential for the production of non-traded good 
decreases its price and moves the marginal product of capital schedule backwards, thus 
pushing capital price down. The aggregate effect on capital price depends on the value of 
elasticity of substitution between domestic non-traded and imported good σ : the capital price 
will increase (decrease), if σ  is higher (lower) than the elasticity of factor substitution in 
domestic industry
12  D σ . Figure 3.1 (3.2.) corresponds to the case where low-skilled 
immigration leads to lower (higher) capital price, with equilibrium moving from point 1 to 2. 
As a consequence, sufficiently low (high) level of σ  implies outflow of domestic capital 
(inflow of foreign capital). 
 
Fig. 3.1. Low-skilled immigration induced change in FDI flow( ) D σ σ < , capital inflow 
decreases the price of domestic non-traded good. 
 
                                                 
12 The formal proof can be found in Ivlevs (2005).  
R












MP(E)   18
 
Fig. 3.1. Low-skilled immigration induced change in FDI flow( ) D σ σ > , capital inflow 
increases the price of domestic non-traded good. 
 
As in the case of high-skilled immigrants, capital flows induce changes in non-traded good 
price, depending of the values of  N α (showing which sector absorbs more capital) and 
elasticity of substitution between consumption goods σ . This can increase or decrease capital 
price, again modifying the extent of FDI inflows or outflows. In figure 3.1. I show the case 
where capital outflow diminishes non-traded good price (otherwise the curve MP’’’(D) would 
end up somewhere between MP(D) and MP’’(D)). In figure 3.2. capital inflow increases the 
domestic non-traded good price.  
 
To obtain the formal expression for the change in capital flows after low-skilled immigration, 






























































      ( 1 7 )  
Equation (17) confirms the critical role of the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
goods in determining the direction of FDI flows after low-skilled immigration. If non-traded 
and imported goods are strong substitutes ( ) ∞ → σ , one percent increase in low-skilled 
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immigration will lead to  ND λ  capital inflow. If elasticity of substitution between consumption 
goods is inferior to elasticity of factor substitution in production, the capital will flow out of 
the country.  
 
 
5. ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION  
 
In this part of the work, I explain the attitudes that native individuals would take towards 
foreign labour, both low-skilled and high-skilled. After having examined attitudes when 
capital is mobile across borders (sub-section 5.1), I compare them with the attitudes that are 
obtained in an identical economy in the absence of international capital mobility (subsection 
5.2.).  This would provide additional understanding of the potential change in attitudes 
towards immigration in the globalisation context, particularly if a country liberalises its 
capital flows.  
 
5.1. ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION WITH INTERNATIONAL 
CAPITAL MOBILITY.   
 
Normally, if immigration of either high-skilled or low-skilled labour leads to positive FDI 
flows, inducing economy’s higher productive capacity and growth prospects, native 
individuals should advocate such immigration. However, it can be argued that individuals are 
more preoccupied by immediate changes in their personal income instead of thinking about 
future average per capita income growth. In other words, “selfish” considerations about 
personal welfare will (almost) always dominate “altruistic” ones about economy’s as a whole 
growth prospects.  Thus, when asked to express their views about inflow of foreign labour 
and, consequently, on the shape of immigration policy, I assume that the typical voter’s 
choice would be the reflection of the change in her welfare after immigration.  
 
Leaving social, xenophobic or cultural arguments aside
13, I will assume that individual’s 
welfare is influenced only by changes in her nominal income and consumption prices. In 
addition, I make a hypothesis that each individual possesses exactly one unit of either high-
skilled or low-unskilled labour, and a positive amount of capital. All individuals are assumed 
                                                 
13 However, see e.g. Schiff (2002), Mayda (2005) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2004) for the theoretical and 
empirical analysis if non-economic factors influencing attitudes towards immigrants.   20
to have identical utility (welfare) functions. Following Mayer’s (1984) approach for 
calculating median voter utility change after the imposition of a tariff, I obtain the utility 
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, j = E, D , h = E, D     (18.1) 
 
where h is individual’s i association with either type of specific labour.  
 
Taking into account perfect international capital mobility ( ) 0 ˆ = N R  and the fact that each 
individual owns exactly one unit of labour ( )
i





















,         j = E, D , h = E, D        (18.2) 
 
Thus, to know the attitude of a particular individual toward the inflow of low-skilled and 
high-skilled labour, it is sufficient to establish the direction of change in her labour income 
after immigration. Since the majority may be represented by high-skilled or low-skilled 




























. According to equations (7) and (8), 
the wage of either specific labour depends both on changes in factor supplies and changes in 
domestic price (the price for exported good is assumed to be constant). As the immigration of 
foreign workers leads to FDI flows, and both labour and capital flows modify domestic non-
traded good price, the growth of the price of specific factor can be expressed as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) { } j N j N j D h V V V V V p f R ˆ ˆ , ˆ   , ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ =         j = D, E 
 
The analysis in the previous chapter suggests that high-skilled immigrants raise price of the 
non-traded good, and the low-skilled decrease it. Even if the consecutive capital flows may 
change the non-traded good price in the opposite direction, the immigration effect will be 
                                                 
14 See Ivlevs (2005), appendix A.7.    21
dominant
15. Table 1 displays the sign of the effect that immigration, FDI flows and domestic 
price exert on specific labour wage.  
 
  
D R ˆ   E R ˆ  
High-skilled immigration 
) ( ) ( ) (
,
↑ ↑ ↑
→ D N E p V V   -  +  +  -  +  - 
Low-skilled immigration 
D σ σ >  
) ( ) ( ) (
,
↓ ↑ ↑
→ D N D p V V   -  +  -  -  +  + 
Low-skilled immigration 
D σ σ <  
) ( ) ( ) (
,
↓ ↓ ↑
→ D N D p V V   -  -  -  -  -  + 
 
Table 1. Specific factor returns and immigration.  
 







 (if  D σ σ < ): the wage (or 
welfare) of the low-skilled individual decreases with the inflow of immigrants of the same 
type given that domestic non-traded and imported goods are sufficiently weak substitutes. 









 independently of the level of σ  ; in this case, positive effects outweigh negative 
ones, and welfare of high-skilled voter will not be affected by low-skilled immigration. 





















(if  D σ σ > ), which must be solved for algebraically. 
For this, I substitute equations (15), (16.2) and (17) into equations (7) and (8). Simplifying
16 














 (irrespectively of the value of σ ). 







 depends on the value of ∆. If ∆ is higher (lower) than 1, nominal wage of 
the skilled workers goes down (up) with the inflow of high-skilled immigrants. This 
corresponds to the equation (8) where lower levels of ∆ reinforce the positive effect 
stemming from capital inflow on  E R . Alternatively, positive effect from capital inflow 
                                                 
15 See app. A.2- A.4 for the formal proof.  
16 See appendix.    22
outweighs negative effects from higher supply the high-skilled and higher non-traded good 
price, if ∆ is inferior to 1.   
 
The changes in factor prices due to immigration are directly transmitted the preferences of 
native individuals over foreign labour inflow. According to equation (18.2) the voter will be 
for (against) the inflow of immigrants, if the nominal income of the specific labour that she 
owns goes up (down). Table 2 summarises the findings about the direction of change of 
specific factor prices, showing the stance taken by the median voter vis-à-vis low-skilled and 
high-skilled immigrants. 
 
Median voter   
Low-skilled High-skilled 
Low-skilled Against  Indifferent   




For if  1 < ∆  
Indifferent if  1 = ∆  
Against if  1 > ∆  
 
Table 2. Natives’ attitudes towards immigration.  
 
As mentioned above, the attitudes on immigration are based exclusively on the variation of 
personal income. Indeed, it is almost impossible to find an individual voting for the removal 
of migration barriers, if her welfare decreases with immigration. However, a particular case of 
indifferent stance towards immigrants deserves more attention. The above-mentioned results 
suggest that the high-skilled median voter would be indifferent to the inflow of low-skilled 
foreign workers because there is no change in her nominal income. In this case these voters 
could take into consideration other effects from immigration, both of economic and non-
economic nature
17 and become pro- or anti-immigrant. For example, the inflow of low-skilled 
immigrants leads to the change in capital stock of the economy, with the direction of change 
depending on the level of σ . More capital means the expansion of production possibilities 
and higher strong prospects, and vice versa, therefore, I would assume that the natives prefer 
inward capital flows to the outward ones. Again, I consider only economic effects of capital 
                                                 
17 Compared to the change in nominal income, other economic and non-economic effects from immigration can 
defined as those of “second order”. They become decisive only if the “first order” effect, or change in 
individual’s nominal income” is equal to zero.    23
flows (new working places, growth etc.), ignoring all non-materialistic arguments, as I did for 
the case of labour flows
18.  Thus, high-skilled median voter will favour (oppose) low-skilled 
immigration, if it will bring about foreign capital inflow, that is, if the elasticity of substitution 
between imported and non-traded good exceeds (falls short of) the elasticity of factor 
substitution in non-traded good sector.  
 
 
5.2.  CHANGE IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION IF CAPITAL 
BECOMES MOBILE INTERNATIONALLY. 
 
The purpose of this subsection is to find out how would change the attitudes towards 
immigrants if a country becomes integrated into international capital markets. For this, I use 
the results obtained in Ivlevs (2005) for the economy which is closed in the sense that 
international capital movements are possible.  
 
Specifically, without international capital mobility, the return to capital is not exogenous and 
varies if there is immigration. Therefore, native individuals will be concerned by their both 
labour and capital income. By assumption, each individual owns one unit of sector specific 
labour (low-skilled or high-skilled) and some amount of capital. Low-skilled (high-skilled) 
natives are assumed to be capital poor (capital rich) which means that altogether they posses 
less capital than it is employed in the sector they are specific to. Capital is equally distributed 
within each labour group. Given such distribution of capital,  the attitudes toward immigration 
are summarised in the following table
19.  
 
While the low-skilled native voters will always be against the inflow of low-skilled 
immigrants and the high-skilled will always favour high-skilled immigration, the elasticity of  
substitution between non-traded and imported goods appears to be crucial in determining 
natives’ attitudes towards labour of different type. Comparing table 3 to the results obtained in 
table 2 and assuming that voters prefer positive FDI to negative FDI
20, natives’ attitudes 
towards low-skilled immigrants should not change when economy liberalises its capital flows. 
However, the reasons why high-skilled natives prefer of not low-skilled immigrants are not 
                                                 
18 One could easily argue that some natives simply do not like any inflow of foreign capital, even if it contributes 
to the welfare of the economy.   
19 See Ivlevs (2005), table 3.  
20 This means that “Indifferent” should be replaced by “For if sig > sig D, and Against if sig < D”.    24
the same in both cases. With no international capital mobility, these attitudes are determined 
directly by changes in factor income. When capital becomes mobile across borders the direct 
effect from factor income change is zero, but I assume that immigration induced positive 
(negative) FDI  flows make native voters better (worse) off.  
 
Median voter   
Low-skilled High-skilled 
Low-skilled Against  For if sig >  D σ  





For if sig<sigLS 




Table 3. Attitudes towards immigration without international capital mobility.  
 
As to the attitudes towards high-skilled immigrants, those of thee low-skilled natives improve 
and become positive irrespectively of the level of sigma. On the other hand, international 
capital mobility increases high-skilled natives’ opposition to high-skilled immigrants if 





Contrary to the rapid trade and capital flows liberalization, international labour flows are 
often determined by restrictive immigration policies. In such a situation labourers’ wages 
systematically fall short of those in host countries, whereas free international movement of 
capital tend to assure equalization of capital price across countries. Another reason for 
asymmetry between labour and capital flows consists in higher physical, human and economic 
costs of migration. This can explain the speed with which different factors cross borders for 
better employment opportunities. Relying on these asymmetries, I assume that capital flows 
respond endogenously to any exogenous migration shock (represented, for example, by the 
increase in immigration quota), and try to determine whether international high-skilled and 
low-skilled labour on the one hand and capital flows on the other are complements or 
substitutes.    25
 
I find that the inflow of high-skilled immigrants always induces an inward flow of FDI, 
meaning the two are complements.  On the other hand, low-skilled immigration may cause an 
outflow of capital, if domestic non-traded good and imported good are sufficiently weak 
substitutes in consumption, implying a factor flows are substitutes in quantity sense.  
Since the results of the model can be applied to immigration and emigration, some 
conclusions can be drawn concerning the aggregate welfare in sending countries. The outflow 
of high-skilled individuals is particularly disastrous for the economy, since it leads to net 
capital outflow. On the contrary, low-skilled emigration may result in net FDI inflows, if non-
traded and imported goods are weak substitutes. Therefore, taking the example of the enlarged 
EU, governments of the new member states should prevent the outflow of high-skilled 
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 cannot be superior to 
1. Multiplying it by D β , which by definition is positive and less than one, and subtracting the 
product from 1 gives some positive value.  
 







 is positive : 
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 is negative : 
Insert equation (17) into (7):  























































































































































































































 is necessarily negative.  
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